UNC2447 SOMBRAT and FIVEHANDS Ransomware: A Sophisticated Financial Threat

Mandiant has observed an aggressive financially motivated group,
UNC2447, exploiting one SonicWall VPN zero-day vulnerability prior to
a patch being available and deploying sophisticated malware previously
reported by other vendors as SOMBRAT. Mandiant has linked the use of
SOMBRAT to the deployment of ransomware, which has not been previously
reported publicly.

UNC2447 monetizes intrusions by extorting their victims first with
FIVEHANDS ransomware followed by aggressively applying pressure
through threats of media attention and offering victim data for sale
on hacker forums. UNC2447 has been observed targeting organizations in
Europe and North America and has consistently displayed advanced
capabilities to evade detection and minimize post-intrusion forensics.

Mandiant has observed evidence of UNC2447 affiliated actors
previously using RAGNARLOCKER ransomware. Based on technical and
temporal observations of HELLOKITTY and FIVEHANDS deployments,
Mandiant suspects that HELLOKITTY may have been used by an overall
affiliate program from May 2020 through December 2020, and FIVEHANDS
since approximately January 2021.


In November 2020, Mandiant created UNC2447, an uncategorized group
observed using the novel WARPRISM PowerShell dropper to install BEACON
at two Mandiant Managed Defense clients. Mandiant Managed Defence
quicky neutralized these intrusions and did not observe attempts to
deploy ransomware.

In January and February 2021, Mandiant Consulting observed a novel
rewrite of DEATHRANSOM—dubbed FIVEHANDS—along with SOMBRAT at multiple
victims that were extorted. During one of the ransomware intrusions,
the same WARPRISM and BEACON samples previously clustered under
UNC2447 were observed. Mandiant was able to forensically link the use
of WARPRISM, BEACON, SOMBRAT and FIVEHANDS to the same actor.

Mandiant suspects that HELLOKITTY activity in late-2020 may be
related to the overall affiliate program and that usage shifted to
FIVEHANDS ransomware beginning in January 2021.

  • In April 2021, Mandiant observed a private FIVEHANDS TOR chat
    using a HELLOKITTY favicon (Figure 1).

UNC2447 SOMBRAT and FIVEHANDS Ransomware: A Sophisticated Financial Threat

Figure 1: FIVEHANDS Hello Kitty icon

When affiliate-based ransomware is observed by Mandiant,
uncategorized clusters are assigned based on the infrastructure used,
and in the case of UNC2447 were based on the SOMBRAT and Cobalt Strike
BEACON infrastructure used across 5 intrusions between November 2020
and February 2021. Generally, Mandiant uses caution even with novel
malware such as SOMBRAT and WARPRISM and clusters each use rigorously
according to all observed activity. For more information on
uncategorized threats, refer to our post, “DebUNCing
Attribution: How Mandiant Tracks Uncategorized Threat Actors

SonicWall SMA 100 Series Appliance Vulnerability

CVE-2021-20016 is a critical SQL injection vulnerability that
exploits unpatched SonicWall Secure Mobile Access SMA 100 series
remote access products. A remote, unauthenticated attacker could
submit a specially crafted query in order to exploit the
vulnerability. Successful exploitation would grant an attacker the
ability to access login credentials (username, password) as well as
session information that could then be used to log into a vulnerable
unpatched SMA 100 series appliance. This vulnerability only impacted
the SMA 100 series and was patched by SonicWall in February 2021. For
more information on this vulnerability, please refer to SonicWall
PSIRT advisory SNWLID-2021-0001


WARPRISM is a PowerShell dropper that has been observed by Mandiant
delivering SUNCRYPT, BEACON, and MIMIKATZ. WARPRISM is used to evade
endpoint detection and will load its payload directly into memory.
WARPRISM may be used by multiple groups.


FOXGRABBER is a command line utility used to harvest FireFox
credential files from remote systems. It contains the PDB path:
C:UserskolobkoSourceReposgrabffobjDebuggrabff.pdb. FOXGRABBER
has also been observed in DARKSIDE ransomware intrusions.

BEACON Malleable Profiles

In the initial stages of an intrusion, UNC2447 uses the Cobalt
Strike BEACON HTTPSSTAGER implant for persistence to communicate with
command-and-control (C2) servers over HTTPS and has been observed
using ‘chches_APT10’ and ‘Havex’ Malleable profiles.

UNC2447 Toolbox

During the recon and exfiltration stage of intrusions, UNC2447 has
been observed using the following tools: ADFIND, BLOODHOUND, MIMIKATZ,
tamper with windows security settings, firewall rules, and antivirus protection.

SOMBRAT Overview

SOMBRAT was first reported by Blackberry Cylance in November 2020 as
CostaRicto Campaign: Cyber-Espionage Outsourced
” as a
potential espionage-for-hire criminal group. Mandiant has now observed
SOMBRAT alongside FIVEHANDS ransomware intrusions.

The SOMBRAT backdoor is packaged as a 64-bit Windows executable. It
communicates with a configurable command and control (C2) server via
multiple protocols, including DNS, TLS-encrypted TCP, and potentially
WebSockets. Although the backdoor supports dozens of commands, most of
them enable the operator to manipulate an encrypted storage file and
reconfigure the implant. The backdoor’s primary purpose is to download
and execute plugins provided via the C2 server. In contrast to the
SOMBRAT version published in November 2020, Mandiant observed
additional obfuscation and armoring to evade detection, this SOMBRAT
variant has been hardened to discourage analysis. Program metadata
typically included by the compiler has been stripped and strings have
been inlined and encoded via XOR-based routines.

The SOMBRAT Launcher

This SOMBRAT backdoor variant must be deployed alongside four
additional resources that serve as launchers. They are typically
installed to the hardcoded directory path `C:ProgramDataMicrosoft`. 

  • path: `C:programdataMicrosoftWwanSvc.bat` – launcher for
  • path: `C:programdataMicrosoftWwanSvc.txt` –
    decoder and launcher for `WwanSvc.c`
  • path:
    `C:programdataMicrosoftWwanSvc.c` – decoder and launcher for
  • path: `C:programdataMicrosoftWwanSvc.a` – XOR
  • path: `C:programdataMicrosoftWwanSvc.b` – encoded
    SOMBRAT backdoor
  • path: `%TEMP%<possibly unique random
    name>` – encrypted storage file
  • path:
    `%TEMP%<possibly unique random name _<integer>` –
    encrypted storage file
  • path: `C:ProgramData<possibly
    unique random name ` – encrypted configuration file

Other variations of the filenames were observed such as ntuser and wapsvc.

SOMBRAT Technical Details

The SOMBRAT backdoor is written in modern C++ and implemented as a
collection of “plugins” that interoperate with one another.
There are five plugins distributed with this variant: `core`,
`network`, `storage`, `taskman`, and `debug` (the `config` plugin
described by Blackberry is not present). The core plugins communicate
with the C2 server via messages sent over a common networking layer;
each plugin supports its own set of messages, and the backdoor
protocol can be extended by dynamically loaded plugins.

The `core` plugin coordinates state tracking, such as network
connectivity, and dynamic plugin loading and unloading. The `network`
plugin configures the networking layer used to communicate with the C2
server, for example enabling the operator to switch between DNS and
TCP protocols. The `storage` plugin exposes logical operations, such
as read and write, for an encrypted file used to store plugins,
resources, and arbitrary data. The `taskman` plugin enables the
operator to list and kill processes on the compromised system.
Finally, the `debuglog` plugin supports a single command to records
debug messages.

Given that the core plugins do not enable an operator directly
execute arbitrary commands or reconfigure the system, the primary
function of the SOMBRAT backdoor is to load plugins provided via the
C2 server. These plugins may be shellcode or DLL modules to be
dynamically loaded. The C2 server may instruct the backdoor to load
the plugins directly or persist them into the encrypted storage file,
where they may subsequently be reloaded, such as after upgrading the backdoor.

Figure 2: Malware author mark “No one is
perfect except me.”

SOMBRAT evades forensic analysis by patching the process memory used
to record command line arguments. It replaces the initial command line
with the base filename of the program executable, removing any
arguments. This means that investigators that inspect a process
listing via memory forensics will see the innocuous-looking command
line `powershell.exe` rather than references to the uncommon filename
such as `WwanSvc.c`.

SOMBRAT Network Communications

The SOMBRAT backdoor can communicate with its C2 server using both
DNS and a proxy-aware, TLS-encrypted stream protocol. By default, the
backdoor uses the DNS protocol; however, this can be reconfigured by
the C2 server. Mandiant observed the domains feticost[.]com and
celomito[.]com used for DNS C2 communications.

When the backdoor communicates via its DNS protocol, it constructs
and resolves FQDNs, interpreting the DNS results to extract C2
messages. The authoritative DNS server embeds data within the IP
address field of DNS A record results and within the Name
Administrator field of DNS TEXT record results. By making many
requests to unique subdomains of the C2 domain, the backdoor can
slowly transmit information a few bytes at a time.

Ransomware Similarities

Beginning in October 2020, Mandiant observed samples of a customized
version of DEATHRANSOM. This newly modified version removed the
language check feature (Figure 3 shows the language check of DEATHRANSOM).

Figure 3: Language check from Fortinet blog

  • HELLOKITTY ransomware—used to target
    Polish video game developer
    CD Projekt Red—is reportedly built

    • HELLOKITTY is named after a mutex named
      ‘HELLOKITTYMutex,’ used when the malware executable is launched
      (see Figure 4).

Figure 4: HELLOKITTY mutex shown in
Process Explorer

In January 2021, Mandiant observed a new ransomware deployed against
a victim and assigned the name FIVEHANDS.

  • Analysis of FIVEHANDS revealed high similarity to DEATHRANSOM,
    sharing several features, functions, and coding similarities. Absent
    in FIVEHANDS is a language check, similar to HELLOKITTY
  • Both DEATHRANSOM and FIVEHANDS drops a ransom note in all
    non-excluded directories


DEATHRANSOM is written in C while the other two families are written
in C++. DEATHRANSOM uses a distinct series of do/while loops to
enumerate through network resources, logical drives, and directories.
It also uses QueueUserWorkItem to implement thread pooling for its
file encryption threads.

HELLOKITTY is written in C++, but reimplements a significant portion
of DEATHRANSOM’s functionality using similar loop operations and
thread pooling via QueueUserWorkItem. The code structure to enumerate
network resources, logical drives, and perform file encryption is very
similar. Additionally, HELLOKITTY and DEATHRANSOM share very similar
functions to check for the completion status of their encryption
threads before exiting.

FIVEHANDS is written in C++ and although high level functionality is
similar, the function calls and code structure to implement the
majority of the functionality is written differently. Also, instead of
executing threads using QueueUserWorkItem, FIVEHANDS uses
IoCompletionPorts to more efficiently manage its encryption threads.
FIVEHANDS also uses more functionality from the C++ standard template
library (STL) than does HELLOKITTY.

Deletion of Volume Shadow Copies

DEATHRANSOM, HELLOKITTY, and FIVEHANDS use the same code to delete
volume shadow copies via WMI by performing the query select * from
Win32_ShadowCopy and then deleting each instance returned by its id.

Encryption Operations

Each of these three malware families utilizes a similar encryption
scheme. An asymmetric public key is either hard-coded or generated. A
unique symmetric key is generated for each encrypted file.

  • After each file is encrypted, the asymmetric key will encrypt
    the symmetric key and append it to the encrypted file. Additionally,
    a unique four byte magic value is appended to the end of the
    encrypted file. The malware checks for these magic bytes to ensure
    it does not encrypt a previously encrypted file again.
  • DEATHRANSOM and HELLOKITTY implement the file encryption
    operations using a very similar code structure and flow.
  • FIVEHANDS implements its file encryption with a differing code
    structure and uses different embedded encryption libraries.
  • In addition to the symmetric key, HELLOKITTY and FIVEHANDS also
    encrypts file metadata with the public key and appends this to the
    encrypted file.
  • DEATHRANSOM generates an RSA key pair while
    HELLOKITTY and FIVEHANDS use an embedded RSA or NTRU public


  • DEATHRANSOM creates an RSA-2048 public and private key pair.
    Using an Elliptic-curve Diffie–Hellman (ECDH) routine implemented
    with Curve25519, it computes a shared secret using two input values:
    1) 32 random bytes from a RtlGenRandom call and 2) a hardcoded 32
    byte value (attacker’s public key). It also create a Curve25519
    public key. The shared secret is SHA256 hashed and used as the key
    to Salsa20 encrypt the RSA public and private keys.
  • The RSA
    public key is used to encrypt the individual symmetric keys that are
    used to encrypt each file. A Base64 encoded version of the encrypted
    RSA keys and the victim’s Curve25519 public key is included in the
    ransom note, providing the threat actors the information needed to
    decrypt the victim’s files.
  • For the symmetric key,
    DEATHRANSOM calls RtlGenRandom to generate 32 random bytes. This is
    the 32 byte key used to AES encrypt each file. After the file is
    encrypted, the AES key is encrypted with the public RSA key and
    appended to the file.
  • DEATHRANSOM lastly appends the four
    magic bytes of AB CD EF AB at the end of the encrypted file and uses
    this as a check to ensure that it does not encrypt an already
    encrypted file.
  • The analyzed DEATHRANSOM sample used for
    comparison does not change the file extension.


  • HELLOKITTY contains an embedded RSA-2048 public key. This
    public key is SHA256 hashed and used as the victim ID within the
    ransom note. This RSA pubic key is also used to encrypt each file’s
    symmetric key.
  • For the symmetric key, HelloKitty generates
    a 32 byte seed value based on the CPU timestamp. A Salsa20 key is
    generated and encrypts a second 32 byte seed value. The encrypted
    result is XOR’d with the first seed, resulting in a 32 byte key used
    to AES encrypt each file.
  • After each file is encrypted, the
    original file size, magic value of DE C0 AD BA, and AES key are
    encrypted with the public RSA key and appended to the file.
    HELLOKITTY and FIVEHANDS appends this additional metadata to the
    encrypted file, while DEATHRANSOM does not.
  • Lastly it
    appends the four magic bytes DA DC CC AB to the end of the encrypted
  • Depending on the version, HELLOKITTY may or may not
    change the file extension.
  • Other samples of HELLOKITTY have
    used an embedded NTRU public key instead of RSA.

FIVEHANDS Encryption

  • FIVEHANDS uses an embedded NTRU public key. This NTRU key is
    SHA512 hashed and the first 32 bytes are used as the victim ID
    within the ransom note. This NTRU pubic key is also used to encrypt
    each file’s symmetric key.
  • For the symmetric key, FIVEHANDS
    uses an embedded generation routine to produce 16 random bytes used
    for an AES key to encrypt each file.
  • After each file is
    encrypted, the original file size, magic value of DE C0 AD BA, and
    AES key are encrypted with the public NTRU key and appended to the
  • The four magic bytes DB DC CC AB are appended to the
    end of the encrypted file.
  • FIVEHANDS includes additional
    code not found in DEATHRANSOM and HELLOKITTY to use the Windows
    Restart Manager to close a file currently in use so that it can be
    unlocked and successfully encrypted.
  • The encrypted file
    extension is changed to .crypt  extension
    encryption flow and sequence is very different from the other two,
    partially because it incorporates asynchronous I/O requests and uses
    different embedded encryption libraries.

FIVEHANDS Encrypted Dropper

One significant change between DEATHRANSOM and FIVEHANDS is the use
of a memory-only dropper, which upon execution, expects a command line
switch of -key followed by the key value necessary to perform
decryption of its payload. The payload is stored and encrypted with
AES-128 using an IV of “85471kayecaxaubv”. The decrypted FIVEHANDS
payload is immediately executed after decryption. To date, Mandiant
has only observed encrypted droppers with a common imphash of 8517cf209c905e801241690648f36a97.

CLI arguments

FIVEHANDS can receive a CLI argument for a path, this limits the
ransomware’s file encryption activities to the specified directory.
DEATHRANSOM and HELLOKITTY do not accept CLI arguments.

Locale and Mutex checks

DEATHRANSOM performs language ID and keyboard layout checks. If
either of these match Russian, Kazakh, Belarusian, Ukrainian or Tatar
it exits. Neither HELLOKITTY or FIVEHANDS perform language ID or
keyboard checks.

HELLOKITTY performs a mutex check while the other two do not perform
mutex checks.

File Exclusions

DEATHRANSOM and HELLOKITTY both exclude the same directories and files:

programdata, $recycle.bin, program files, windows, all users,
appdata, read_me.txt, autoexec.bat, desktop.ini, autorun.inf,
ntuser.dat, iconcache.db, bootsect.bak, boot.ini, ntuser.dat.log, or thumbs.db.

The exclusions for FIVEHANDS are more extensive and contain
additional files and directories to ignore.

Additional Differences

  • DEATHRANSOM makes an external HTTPS connection to download a
    file. Neither HELLOKITTY or FIVEHANDS initiate network
  • HELLOKITTY contains code to set the victims
    wallpaper to a ransom related image. The other samples do not have
    this functionality
  • Different versions of DEATHRANSOM and
    HELLOKITTY are known to change the file extension
  • Different
    versions of HELLOKITTY are known to check for specific processes to





Programming Language




Symmetric Encryption

AES 128


AES 256

Asymmetric Encryption

Embedded NTRU Key

Embedded RSA or NTRU Key

Curve25519 ECDH and RSA key creation

Same directory and file name exclusions




Accepts CLI Arguments




Network Connections




Locale Check




Mutex Check




Bytes Appended to Encrypted Files




Table 1: Ransomware feature comparison


Mandiant observed SOMBRAT and FIVEHANDS ransomware by the same group
since January 2021. While similarities between HELLOKITTY and
FIVEHANDS are notable, ransomware may be used by different groups
through underground affiliate programs. Mandiant will assign an
uncategorized cluster based on multiple factors including
infrastructure used during intrusions and as such, not all SOMBRAT or
FIVEHANDS ransomware intrusions may have been conducted by UNC2447.
ransomware demonstrating additional complexity and sharing between
different ransomware affiliate programs.


  • 87c78d62fd35bb25e34abb8f4caace4a
  • 6382d48fae675084d30ccb69b4664cbb
    (31dcd09eb9fa2050aadc0e6ca05957bf unxored)
SOMBRAT Launcher
  • cf1b9284d239928cce1839ea8919a7af (wwansvc.a XOR key)
  • 4aa3eab3f657498f52757dc46b8d1f11 (wwansvc.c)
  • 1f6495ea7606a15daa79be93070159a8 (wwansvc.bat)
  • 31dcd09eb9fa2050aadc0e6ca05957bf (wwansvc.b)
  • edf567bd19d09b0bab4a8d068af15572 (wwansvc.b)
  • a5b26931a1519e9ceda04b4c997bb01f (wwansvc.txt)
  • f0751bef4804fadfe2b993bf25791c49
    (4aa3eab3f657498f52757dc46b8d1f11 unxored)
  • 87c78d62fd35bb25e34abb8f4caace4a
    (edf567bd19d09b0bab4a8d068af15572 unxored)
SOMBRAT domains
  • Celomito[.]com (unc2447)
  • Feticost[.]com
  • Cosarm[.]com
  • Portalcos[.]com
  • 39ea2394a6e6c39c5d7722dc996daf05
  • f568229e696c0e82abb35ec73d162d5e
FIVEHANDS Encrypted Dropper
  • 6c849920155f48d4b4aafce0fc49eb5b
  • 22d35005e926fe29379cb07b810a6075
  • 57824214710bc0cdb22463571a72afd0
  • 87c0b190e3b4ab9214e10a2d1c182153
  • 1b0b9e4cddcbcb02affe9c8124855e58
  • 46ecc24ef6d20f3eaf71ff37610d57d1
  • 1a79b6d169aac719c9323bc3ee4a8361
  • a64d79eba40229ae9aaebbd73938b985
  • 136bd70f7aa98f52861879d7dca03cf2
  • 06ce6cd8bde756265f95fcf4eecadbe9
  • af568e8a6060812f040f0cb0fd6f5a7b
  • d96adf82f061b1a6c80699364a1e3208
  • c50ab1df254c185506ab892dc5c8e24b
  • c925822c6d5175c30ba96388b07e9e16 (unc2447)
  • c171bcd34151cbcd48edbce13796e0ed
  • d87fcd8d2bf450b0056a151e9a116f72
  • f739977004981fbe4a54bc68be18ea79
  • e18b27f75c95b4d50bfcbcd00a5bd6c5
  • df6e6b3e53cc713276a03cce8361ae0f
  • 1cd03c0d00f7bfa7ca73f7d73677d8f8
  • 8071f66d64395911a7aa0d2057b9b00d
  • c12a96e9c50db5f8b0b3b5f9f3f134f0
  • e39184eacba2b05aaa529547abf41d2b
  • 09a05a2212bd2c0fe0e2881401fbff17
  • 8226d7615532f32eca8c04ac0d41a9fd
  • a01a2ba3ae9f50a5aa8a5e3492891082
  • 29e53b32d5b4aae6d9a3b3c81648653c
  • a809068b052bc209d0ab13f6c5c8b4e7
  • 64.227.24[.]12 Havex Profile January 2021
  • 157.230.184[.]142  chches_ APT10 Profile November 2020-January
  • 74c688a22822b2ab8f18eafad2271cac
  • 7d6e57cbc112ebd3d3c95d3c73451a38
  • 4d3d3919dda002511e03310c49b7b47f

FireEye Detections

FireEye Network Security

FireEye Email Security

FireEye Detection On

FireEye Malware Analysis

FireEye Malware
File Protect



  • FE_Loader_Win32_Generic_162
  • FE_Ransomware_Win32_FIVEHANDS_1
  • Malware.Binary.exe
  • Ransomware.Win.Generic.MVX


  • FE_Backdoor_Win64_SOMBRAT_1
  • Backdoor.Win.SOMBRAT
  • Malware.Binary.exe
  • Backdoor.Win.SOMBRAT.MVX
  • FEC_Trojan_PS1_Generic_7
  • FEC_Trojan_PS1_Generic_8
  • FEC_Trojan_BAT_Generic_5


  • Ransomware.Win.Generic.MVX
  • Malware.Binary.exe
  • Ransomware.Win.HELLOKITTY.MVX
  • FE_Ransomware_Win_HELLOKITTY_1
  • FE_Ransomware_Win32_HELLOKITTY_1


  • FE_Loader_Win32_Generic_92
  • Ransomware.Win.Generic.MVX
  • Malware.Binary.exe


  • FE_Loader_Win32_BLUESPINE_1
  • Backdoor.BEACON
  • Malware.Binary.exe


  • FE_Loader_PS1_WARPRISM_1
  • FEC_Loader_PS1_WARPRISM_1
  • Backdoor.BEACON
  • Trojan.Generic
  • Trojan.Win.SYSTEMBC
  • Backdoor.Meterpreter
  • Malware.Binary.exe
  • Malware.Binary.ps1


  • FE_Trojan_MSIL_Generic_109

FireEye EndPoint Security

Real-Time (IOC)


Malware Protection (AV/MG)

    • Generic.mg. 87c78d62fd35bb25
    • Generic.mg.6382d48fae675084
    • Trojan.GenericKD.45750384
    • Trojan.GenericKD.36367848
    • Generic.PwShell.RefA.CB5E962A
    • Generic.mg.39ea2394a6e6c39c
    • Generic.mg.f568229e696c0e82
    • Generic.mg.6c849920155f48d4
    • Generic.mg.22d35005e926fe29
    • Generic.mg.57824214710bc0cd
    • Generic.mg.87c0b190e3b4ab92
    • Generic.mg.1b0b9e4cddcbcb02
    • Generic.mg.46ecc24ef6d20f3e
    • Generic.mg.1a79b6d169aac719
    • Generic.mg.a64d79eba40229ae
    • Gen:Variant.Zusy.375932
    • Gen:Variant.Zusy.366866
    • Trojan.GenericKD.46059492
    • Trojan.GenericKD.46059131
    • Trojan.GenericKD.45996121
    • Trojan.GenericKD.45702783
    • Generic.mg.a01a2ba3ae9f50a5
    • Trojan.PowerShell.Agent.IJ
    • Trojan.Agent.EXDR
    • Trojan.PowerShell.Ransom.E
    • Trojan.Agent.EUKPTrojan.GenericKD.45856129
    • Heur.BZC.PZQ.Boxter.829.B5AEB7A6
    • Heur.BZC.PZQ.Boxter.829.B84D01A7
    • Heur.BZC.PZQ.Boxter.829.AE76D25C
    • Trojan.PowerShell.Ransom.F
    • Dropped:Heur.BZC.MNT.Boxter.826.0A2B3A87
    • Heur.BZC.PZQ.Boxter.829.A15701BD
    • Generic.mg.c50ab1df254c1855
    • Trojan.Ransomware.GenericKD.35760206
    • Generic.mg.136bd70f7aa98f52
    • Generic.mg.06ce6cd8bde75626
    • Generic.mg.af568e8a6060812f
    • Generic.mg.d96adf82f061b1a6
    • Generic.Malware.PfVPk!12.299C21F3
    • Gen:Variant.Ransom.HelloKitty.1
    • Generic.Malware.PfVPk!12.606CCA24
    • Generic.Malware.PfVPk!12.1454636C
    • Generic.mg.74c688a22822b2ab
    • Generic.mg.7d6e57cbc112ebd3
    • Trojan.Agent.DDSN




Initial Access

  • T1078 Valid Accounts


  • T1047 Windows Management
  • T1053.005 Scheduled Task / Job:
    Scheduled Task
  • T1059.001 Command and Scripting
    Interpreter: PowerShell
  • T1106 Execution through

Defense Evasion

  • T1045 Software Packing
  • T1055 Process Injection
  • T1140 Deobfuscate /
    Decode Files or Information


  • T1012 Query Registry
  • T1046 Network Service Scanning
  • T1057 Process
  • T1082 System Information Discovery
  • T1124 System Time Discovery
  • T1135 Network Share


  • T1560.003 Archive Collected
    Data: Archive via Custom Method


  • T1485 Data Destruction
  • T1486
    Data Encrypted for Impact
  • T1490 Inhibit System

Command and Control

  • T1071.001 Application Layer
    Protocol: Web Protocols
  • T1090.002 Proxy: External
  • T1572  Protocol Tunneling
  • T1573.002
    Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography


  • T1041 Exfiltration over C2


Thanks to Nick Richard for technical review, Genevieve Stark and
Kimberly Goody for analytical contributions, and Jon Erickson,
Jonathan Lepore, and Stephen Eckels for analysis incorporated into
this blog post.

By admin